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In the previous issue of Pacific Economic 
Bulletin, Uwe Kaufmann argues that new 
trade agreements will lead to welfare gains 
for Pacific islanders—by reducing prices for 
consumers and reducing production costs 
for local businesses that rely on imports—
and that concerns about ‘adjustments in the 
production and financial structure’ of Pacific 
economies will be mitigated by the final 
design of new trade agreements. Kaufmann 
(2009) argues that
The IPA [Interim Economic Partnership 
Agreement] with the European Union 
and the PACER [Pacific Agreement on 
Closer Economic Relations] agreement 
with Australia and New Zealand 
address not just all of the claims and 
fears of the Pacific island countries 
and NGOs in one way or the other, 
but more importantly address the 
common barriers to trade identified 
by the World Trade Organization. 
(Kaufmann 2009: 173-82)
Kaufmann (2009) states that ‘many non-
governmental organisations are antagonistic 
towards trade agreements involving Pacific 
island countries, claiming that they will 
face serious negative consequences if 
they sign up’. At the Pacific Network on 
Globalisation, we are concerned about the 
potential implications of new free trade 
agreements (FTAs) that include Pacific 
island countries (PANG 2009). This article 
responds to Kaufmann’s arguments in 
favour of Pacific FTAs, focusing specifically 
on the PACER Plus negotiations between 
Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific 
island countries.
A trade agreement for whom?
The Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER) was not designed to 
ensure cheaper goods for Pacific islanders 
or address constraints faced by Pacific 
businesses. The agreement was designed 
primarily as a defensive mechanism to 
ensure Australian and New Zealand 
exporters and investors would not be 
disadvantaged if Pacific island countries 
concluded an FTA with other developed 
countries.
The then Australian Foreign Minister, 
Alexander Downer, told Pacific media that 
‘the PACER protects Australian interests 
in the event that Forum Island Countries 
begin negotiations for a free trade agree-
ment or offer improved market access to 
another country’ (‘Enduring commitments: 
an exclusive interview with Australian 
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Foreign Minister Alexander Downer ’, 
Pacific Magazine, [3] [March], http://www.
pacificislands.cc/pm32003/index.php).
When PACER was tabled in the 
Australian Parliament for ratification, an 
accompanying ‘national interest analysis’ 
found that 
without ratification of PACER, 
Australia would be denied an 
enhanced opportunity to negotiate 
better market access to Pacific markets 
for Australian business and industry, 
while any other country, including 
developed countries like member 
states of the European Union, could 
enjoy duty free access to FICs [Forum 
island countries] for their goods. 
(DFAT 2002)
More recently, the Australian govern-
ment has jettisoned talk of PACER Plus 
being a trade agreement designed to protect 
its interests and has instead embraced 
rhetoric about ‘regional integration and 
development’. Australian Trade Minister, 
Simon Crean, and Parliamentary Secretary 
for Overseas Development Assistance, Bob 
McMullan, wrote together in The Canberra 
Times (‘International engagement begins 
in own backyard’, Letters to the Editor, 26 
August 2008) that PACER Plus would be a 
‘new, comprehensive, region-wide “trade-
plus” free trade and economic integration 
agreement’ that would ‘enable the countries 
in our own neighbourhood to share in the 
benefits of increased trade and economic 
growth’.
McMullan toured the region in April 
2009 to try to convince Pacific governments 
that PACER Plus was really about ‘reducing 
poverty’ and not about Australian trade 
interests. He told Radio Australia
[T]his is not about Australia, there’s 
nothing in [PACER Plus] for us, we 
think it’s good for the region. And it 
is an initiative that we want to extend 
because it is beneficial to reduce 
poverty in the region…It doesn’t have 
any economic significance for us; it’s 
just good for the region as a whole and 
that’s why we’re doing it. (‘Australian 
ministers tour Pacific on regional 
free trade push’, Interview with 
Australian Parliamentary Secretary 
for Development Assistance, Radio 
Australia, 1 April 2009, http://www.
radioaustralia.net.au/pacbeat/
stories/200904/s2531920.htm)
In recent years, additional support for 
a regional FTA between Australia, New 
Zealand and the Pacific has come from 
multilateral institutions such as the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB 2008; Luthria 2009). The intellectual 
case for a new FTA has rested largely on 
arguments for the ‘welfare-enhancing’ ef-
fects of tariff reductions and arguments that 
other elements, such as temporary labour 
mobility and ‘aid-for-trade’ resources, could 
be included in the design of PACER Plus to 
outweigh the ‘negative adjustment costs’ for 
the island countries.
We maintain that this is putting the cart 
before the horse. Clearly, trade arrange-
ments between the Pacific island countries 
and Australia and New Zealand can, and 
should, be dramatically improved but there 
is no need to negotiate a dangerous FTA to 
do so. The key question should be: how can 
trade assist with improving development 
outcomes for the Pacific? It should not be: 
how can we make an FTA more palatable?
Tariffs and the revenue 
consequences of PACER Plus
Few (perhaps other than Kaufmann) argue 
that there will not be serious adjustment 
costs for Pacific island countries if they 
conclude a reciprocal FTA with Australia 
and New Zealand. A key cost would be a 
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dramatic loss in government revenue. As 
the World Bank’s senior economist for the 
Pacific region, Dr Manjula Luthria, writes: ‘it 
is hard to deny that the Pacific’s hesitation 
to negotiate the PACER Plus agreement has 
some just cause. After all, tariff revenues 
comprise upwards of 10% of all government 
revenue in most islands, and their reduction 
will leave behind a significant hole in their 
budgets’ (Luthria 2009).
Discussion continues across the region 
about exactly how much government rev-
enue would be lost if PACER Plus negotia-
tions are concluded and, as Kaufmann points 
out, there are significant differences between 
the findings of recent studies into potential 
revenue losses. While acknowledging that 
due to these significant differences, ‘there 
is need for further research on the potential 
tariff revenue losses’, Kaufmann (2009) nev-
ertheless argues that ‘compared with earlier 
studies the latest study of tariff revenue 
losses (Watergall Consulting Limited 2007) 
suggests that potential revenue losses have 
been declining significantly’.
The Watergall report in fact indicates 
that figures contained within it are likely 
to understate revenue losses—as under 
PACER Plus imports from Australia and 
New Zealand would become more com-
petitive and would gain market share from 
other tariff-paying import sources (trade 
diversion from other Southeast Asian 
countries, for example), thereby increasing 
the revenue loss.
In any case, the report indicates that, 
after implementing the Pacific Island 
Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), the 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
and PACER Plus agreements, a number of 
Pacific island countries will lose more than 
20 per cent of their government revenue 
(Vanuatu, Tonga and the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands), and others will face 
dramatic losses as well, such as Kiribati (19 
per cent), Samoa (16 per cent) and Tuvalu (14 
per cent). These are hardly figures to ease the 
concerns of Pacific governments struggling 
to provide social services to growing popu-
lations. For many Pacific island countries, 
the projected revenue losses under PACER 
Plus equate to a significant proportion of—
or exceed—their entire health or education 
budgets (Table 1). 
Clearly, governments in the region 
can ill afford to lose this much revenue. 
Table 1 Government expenditure on health and education and PACER revenue losses 
(as a percentage of the total budget)
Country Education Health PACER revenue loss
Cook Islands (2005) 13.9 11.3 6
Fiji (2002) 29.4 14.3 3
Kiribati (2005) 14.0 9.3 15
Papua New Guinea (2002) 10.0 5.7 2
Samoa (2005) 22.1 16.7 12
Tonga (2002) 12.9 13.9 19
Vanuatu (2005) 22.7 11.1 18
Sources: Gani, A., 2009. ‘Health care financing and health outcomes in Pacific island countries’, Health Policy 
and Planning, 24(1):72–81; Oxfam Australia and Oxfam New Zealand, 2009. PACER Plus and its Alternatives: 
which way forward for trade and development in the Pacific?, Oxfam Australia, Melbourne, and Oxfam New Zealand, 
Auckland.
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Box 1 Introducing a VAT to replace tariff revenue: lessons from Samoa and Tonga 
Pacific countries are frequently told that, to avoid revenue losses as a result of trade liberalisation, they should 
introduce a VAT to meet any shortfall. Samoa, which introduced a value-added goods and services tax (VAGST) 
and unilaterally reduced tariffs in the late 1990s, is often pointed to as an example of successful, trade-oriented 
reform. Tonga has followed suit more recently, introducing a consumption tax in 2005 to offset revenue losses 
on joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), which it did in 2007.
The experience of both countries suggests that this process has been difficult and raises serious questions about 
the ability of both countries to respond to future revenue losses under PACER Plus.
Samoa introduced its VAGST in 1994—levied at 10 per cent—in anticipation of tariff reform. Then, in 1998, 
Samoa unilaterally reduced its applied tariff rates and applied to join the WTO. The fall in tariffs saw a significant 
increase in imports, particularly of food and beverages, adding to Samoa’s already considerable trade deficit 
(Oxfam International 2005). Since then, Samoa has struggled to maintain the revenue needed to pay for essential 
services and has raised the VAGST twice in the past decade to meet its budget needs (to 12.5 per cent in 2002 
and to 15 per cent in 2006). Even with these tax hikes, Samoa continues to struggle to pay for social services 
and infrastructure projects. In its 2009 budget, for example, Samoa cut 8 per cent and 14.9 per cent, respectively, 
from the education and health budgets (Government of Samoa., 2009. 2009/2010 Budget Address: Minister of 
Finance, Hon Niko Lee Hang, http://www.mof.gov.ws/uploads/budget_address_2009-2010.pdf).
Recent studies indicate that Samoa stands to lose at least 16 per cent of its government revenue on implementing 
PICTA, the EPA and PACER Plus—the equivalent of almost all its health budget (Watergall Consulting Limited 
2007). It is difficult to see how services could be maintained without again raising the VAGST or extending it 
to new areas (such as health, education and bus and taxi transport).
If the revenue outlook for Samoa (on the introduction of PACER Plus) looks bleak, it looks no better for Tonga. 
Before 2005, Tonga relied heavily on tariff revenue, with across-the-board tariffs of 25 per cent in place (and 
additional tariff rates applied to some goods—notably, petroleum 35 per cent, vehicles 45 per cent, foodstuffs 
15–25 per cent, alcohol 200 per cent and tobacco 330 per cent). On joining the WTO in 2007, Tonga agreed to bind 
its tariffs at a lower rate than any other country in the history of the WTO (with the sole exception of Armenia), 
reducing applied tariffs to a flat rate of 15 per cent, with an across-the-board bound tariff rate of 20 per cent.
To offset revenue losses, Tonga introduced a consumption tax in 2005, levied at 15 per cent. This policy 
assumption—that tariff revenue would be replaced with a consumption tax—was risky, given problems other 
countries had faced in implementing a VAT and the fact that Tonga had no fall-back position, having agreed 
to a bound tariff rate of 20 per cent. Furthermore, Tonga almost certainly faces the prospect of further tariff 
cuts in future WTO negotiations.
In 2008, Tonga continued with the tax reform required on acceding to the WTO (converting ad valorem tariffs of 
vehicles, fuel, tobacco and alcohol into specific excises, and lowering remaining tariff rates). A 2009 Country Report 
by the IMF found that these changes contributed to a dramatic downturn in Tonga’s government revenue, with 
20 per cent less government revenue than expected collected in 2008/09 (IMF 2009a). The Tongan government 
collected P20 million (2 per cent of GDP) less than it budgeted for.
This dramatic fall in revenue has the potential to compound Tonga’s external debt situation if the government 
takes on new loans to meet the shortfall. A joint study completed last year by the IMF and the World Bank (IMF 
2009b) indicates that Tonga remains ‘at a high risk of debt distress’, having taken on a considerable reconstruction 
loan from the EXIM Bank of China after civil unrest in 2006.
Tonga cannot raise tariffs again (or at least not very far) due to its WTO commitments and it cannot borrow much 
more given its ‘high risk of debt distress’; hence IMF staff have advised the Tongan government to ‘carefully 
prioritise expenditure allocations’, including possibly delaying a planned wage increase for the public sector. It 
also seems likely that Tonga will raise its consumption tax in the future (as Samoa has done). This is especially 
likely if PACER Plus is implemented as an FTA, for recent studies indicate Tonga will lose at least a further 19 per 
cent of government revenue in such a scenario (Watergall Consulting Limited 2007). In the event that this much 
revenue is lost (and given problems with replacing the revenue through the consumption tax), it is hard to see 
how Tonga could service its external debt and continue to provide social services and pay its public servants.
PANG (2009) has argued that because of lost government revenue due to trade liberalisation, Pacific 
governments will be forced to cut services to their people or downsize their public sector. Sadly, it looks 
increasingly likely that this will happen in Tonga. Given the implications of tariff liberalisation for government 
revenue in Samoa and Tonga, and recent experiences in both countries, the onus is on the Australian 
and New Zealand governments to indicate how an FTA could be of benefit for countries such as Samoa 
and Tonga—and the warning for other Pacific states involved in the PACER Plus negotiations is clear. 
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Kaufmann (2009) argues that implementing 
a consumer tax in the form of a value-added 
tax (VAT) would replace this lost revenue. 
He writes: ‘If implemented wisely, this tax 
can be effective in offsetting tariff revenue 
losses. Combined with an excise tax on 
“sinful” goods, such as alcohol, tobacco 
and luxury goods, tariff revenue losses can 
be overcome while serving a social agenda’ 
(Kaufmann 2009:173-82).
There is, however, very little evidence 
that small and low-income countries have 
succeeded in replacing revenue lost through 
the reductions in tariffs. A key study 
completed by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), which asked the question ‘over 
the last 25 years, have countries actually 
managed to offset reductions in trade tax 
revenues by increasing their domestic tax 
revenues?’, found that ‘for low income 
countries, recovery has been far from 
complete…at best, they have on average 
recovered no more than around 30 cents 
of each lost dollar’ (Baunsgaard and Keen 
2005). Furthermore, the study found that 
‘there is no systemic evidence that low-
income countries with a VAT have recovered 
more than those without’ (Baunsgaard 
and Keen 2005)—again, hardly advice that 
would put Pacific governments at ease.
There are recent examples from our 
region of countries struggling to replace lost 
tariff revenue. When the Asian Development 
Bank, as part of conditions for a new loan 
in the late 1990s, forced Vanuatu to lower 
tariffs and introduce a VAT, the country 
suffered massive revenue losses that it 
took many years to recover from (Oxfam 
International 2005). Recent findings from 
Samoa and Tonga also highlight difficulties 
associated with using a VAT to replace trade 
taxes (Box 1).
Despite claims that revenue can be 
replaced through moving to a VAT or 
through ‘prudent financial management’, 
it seems likely that for many Pacific states 
revenue losses incurred under PACER Plus 
will be lasting.
Consumer gains?
Kaufmann (2009) argues that PACER Plus 
could benefit Pacific consumers through 
cheaper imported goods, with flow-on 
benefits to other sectors of the economy 
(increased disposable income to spend on 
other goods and services, for example). 
Experience suggests, however, that even if 
tariffs are lowered, in many cases exporters 
and distributors (‘middle men’) tend to 
increase their prices almost back to the same 
level after tariffs are removed and fail to 
pass on the benefits to consumers.
There are recent examples of this from 
within our region. When Vanuatu lowered 
tariffs as part of conditions for a new ADB 
loan in the late 1990s, benefits were not 
passed on to consumers. A report commis-
sioned by the UN Development Programme 
on Leveraging Trade for Human Development 
in Vanuatu (Wagle 2007) found that one of 
the ‘benefits of trade liberalisation—a fall 
in retail prices of consumer items—is not 
evident in Vanuatu’.
If PACER Plus is designed as an FTA, 
Pacific island countries will need to replace 
lost tariff revenue if they hope to continue to 
supply services to their people. There are a 
number of economies of scale in government 
that very small countries cannot exploit and 
the cost of government is relatively high 
when compared with countries with larger 
populations. If Pacific countries are forced 
to introduce (or raise) consumer taxes to 
replace predicted revenue shortfalls, any 
positive impacts of trade liberalisation 
on Pacific island countries—including on 
consumers—will be far less than stand-
ard economic modelling suggests. If, for 
example, a 15 per cent tariff on a wide 
range of goods is replaced with a 15 per 
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cent VAT, the net effect will be very little. 
Standard economic modelling of the effects 
of trade liberalisation models the effects 
of tariff elimination, holding everything 
else—including other taxes—constant. If, 
instead, governments replace revenue lost 
from tariff elimination by raising alternative 
taxes, this would dramatically undermine 
the economic gains predicted in that 
modelling.
Any fall in the price of consumer goods 
as a result of tariff reductions under PACER 
Plus is likely to be offset at least partially by 
increases in consumption taxes (introduced 
to meet serious government revenue 
shortfalls). Indeed, for many Pacific island 
countries, consumption taxes are already 
imposed at what might be thought of as 
a ‘maximum feasible rate’. To raise taxes 
further would see the regressive effects of 
high consumption taxes becoming increas-
ingly pronounced. Further research into the 
impact of recent tariff reductions, and the 
consequent introduction of a consumption 
tax, on domestic prices in Tonga could be 
useful.
Kaufmann (2009:180) acknowledges 
that for smaller Pacific island countries, 
which are heavily reliant on imports, a 
uniform flat tariff rate and a VAT have 
roughly similar economic effects. Flat 
tariffs, however, are much simpler and less 
costly to administer—with fewer avenues 
for evasion—than a VAT, and switching 
to consumer taxes would transfer the 
administrative burden of collecting taxes to 
small-business owners and operators in the 
Pacific (many of whom work only with cash 
and therefore easily escape the VAT).
A further key point is that Pacific island 
countries can lower tariffs on a unilateral 
basis at any time they like—if such a move 
is deemed to be of benefit to local consum-
ers and producers. This would avoid the 
dangerous—and irreversible—conditions of 
an FTA with Australia and New Zealand.
For many Pacific island countries, 
lowering tariffs further also needs to be 
considered against maintaining local liveli-
hoods and jobs. Allowing cheaper imports 
from Australia and New Zealand to gain a 
greater domestic market share is likely to 
displace local producers—leading to busi-
ness closures and job losses. Narsey (2003) 
predicts that under PACER Plus (if it is 
designed as a reciprocal FTA) three-quarters 
of Pacific manufacturing would close, 
leading to unemployment for thousands of 
workers (Institute for International Trade 
2008:85). Furthermore, some foreign-owned 
subsidiaries operating in the Pacific are 
likely to relocate to Australia and New 
Zealand if tariffs are removed under PACER 
Plus (and export to the region from there), 
compounding further the anticipated rise 
in unemployment and business closures 
(Narsey 2003).
It is not only current businesses that 
would be affected, as PACER Plus would 
radically undermine the policy space avail-
able to develop new Pacific businesses—
reducing the ability to nurture local busi-
nesses through tariff protection, subsidies, 
investment rules (requiring foreign firms 
to partner with local firms), government 
procurement provisions (favouring local 
employers), and so on.
Finally, PACER Plus is not only about 
tariffs affecting trade in goods. PANG has a 
range of other concerns about the potential 
implications of PACER Plus. For example, 
Australia and New Zealand are likely to 
push for an FTA that allows their companies 
to provide services in the Pacific (including 
essential services such as health, education 
and electricity). This could exacerbate 
existing inequalities in access to services in 
the Pacific and reduce policy options avail-
able to ensure universal access to services. 
Furthermore, new rules for Australian and 
New Zealand service providers and inves-
tors could also undermine indigenous land 
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rights in the region if restrictions on foreign 
ownership of land are deemed a ‘market 
access restriction’ during the PACER Plus 
negotiations.
Alternatives to a traditional FTA
Contrary to Kaufmann’s (2009) claim 
that PANG is antagonistic towards trade 
agreements involving the Pacific island 
countries, we fully support new trading 
arrangements that help to improve 
development outcomes for Pacific island 
countries. We maintain, however, that a 
WTO-compatible free trade deal would be 
dangerous—and inappropriate—for the 
region. We also argue that the template 
offered by the EPA discussions with 
the European Union is inappropriate 
in the PACER Plus context. Thankfully, 
arrangements that would genuinely foster 
regional integration and improve trade 
opportunities for the island countries are 
limited only by the political will of the 
parties involved.
There are a number of ways that the 
current South Pacific Regional Trade 
and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA) could be improved to help 
Pacific island countries use trade to over-
come poverty (Table 2 suggests components 
that could be included in a ‘SPARTECA 
Plus’ type arrangement).1
The World Bank recently identified 
two areas of ‘comparative advantage’ for 
the Pacific island countries: agriculture 
and labour (Luthria 2009). It is clear that 
Table 2  Components of a ‘SPARTECA Plus’ trade deal
Investment in trade-related infrastructure (roads, wharves, airports, produce treatment 
facilities, and so on).
Improvements in regional recognition of qualifications and additional resources for regional 
training colleges.
Well-designed regional labour mobility schemes, allowing low-skilled workers to work 
temporarily in Australia and New Zealand.
Improved rules-of-origin requirements for Pacific exports to Australia and New Zealand.
Improvements in Pacific agricultural exports through the removal of quarantine barriers, 
and expediting the assessment (by Australian and New Zealand quarantine agencies) of 
new products for Australian and New Zealand markets.
Investment in regional trade facilitation projects (examples include technical projects through 
the Secretariat of the Pacific Community [SPC] to manage fruit fly in Pacific countries and 
develop new bilateral quarantine agreements with Australia and New Zealand).
Resources to improve the marketing of Pacific produce and provide better market 
information to potential Pacific exporters (building on the capabilities of the Pacific Islands 
Trade and Investment Commission, which has offices in Sydney and Auckland).
Improving the presence of ‘fair trade’ and ‘organic’ exports from the Pacific (by supporting 
the development of regional certifications and helping farmers to overcome barriers to these 
value-added markets—by reducing costs of certification and marketing).
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in both of these areas, a new regional trade 
agreement could be beneficial; but an FTA is 
dangerous and wholly unnecessary.
Taking agriculture first, it is true that 
Pacific agricultural exports are much 
underdeveloped, especially given the 
prevalence of productive agricultural 
systems in the Pacific island countries—for 
subsistence and cash income—and climate 
advantages (for tropical fruits and root 
crops, for example).
A ‘SPARTECA Plus’ regional trade 
agreement could open new export pathways 
for agricultural exports by providing 
resources and expertise to meet Australian 
and New Zealand quarantine requirements, 
and prioritising the assessment of Pacific 
produce by quarantine agencies. At the 
moment, Australia is especially slow at 
assessing the entry of new products (conse-
quently, there is a greater range of ‘export 
pathways’ available for fresh produce to 
enter New Zealand than for the Australian 
market).2
Regional technical programs (providing 
expertise in areas such as entomology 
and plant pathology) could be of great 
assistance in helping exporters meet the 
quarantine and labelling requirements 
for overseas markets. The Regional Fruit 
Flies Management Project (run through the 
SPC from 1994 to 1997) made very good 
progress in developing bilateral quarantine 
agreements for the export of fresh produce 
to New Zealand (McGregor 2007).
As well as facilitating new exports, a 
‘SPARTECA Plus’ agreement could help 
add value to Pacific agricultural exports by 
helping farmers to sell their produce as ‘fair 
trade’ or ‘organic’ produce—allowing retail-
ers to sell Pacific produce for a premium 
to discerning consumers in Australia and 
New Zealand.
The development of ‘fair trade’ produce 
could help to bring much needed cash into 
farming communities and insulate farmers 
against future collapses in commodity 
prices. In Papua New Guinea, for example, 
smallholder farmers are the backbone of 
the coffee export industry and, according 
to recent studies, ‘coffee is the main driver 
of the internal economy…the one that fuels 
economic activity within the country’ (Riedl 
2009).3
SPARTECA Plus could also contain 
commitments to build on the capacity of 
the Pacific Island Trade and Investment 
Commission (PITIC) by expanding the 
organisation’s ability to undertake market 
research on behalf of Pacific exporters 
and assist with the marketing of ‘Pacific’ 
branded products. Developing new market-
ing for agricultural products as ‘fresh from 
tropical paradise’—building on popular 
conceptions of the Pacific—could add a 
premium to exports. The export success of 
‘Pure Fiji’ beauty products is built on such 
a marketing strategy.
Under a SPARTECA Plus arrangement, 
new resources could also be allocated to 
improving key trading infrastructure (such 
as rural roads, ports and pre-shipment 
quarantine facilities). 
In comparison, designing PACER 
Plus as an FTA would remove key policy 
options for developing Pacific agriculture 
(including seasonal tariff protection and 
occasional subsidies when prices for island 
commodities, such as copra, fall) and is 
likely to promote a greater reliance on food 
imports and increased competition for local 
producers from foods produced in Australia 
and New Zealand. Over time, this would 
undermine the income and livelihoods of 
local farmers.
The World Bank argues that, other than 
agriculture, ‘the other main exportable 
item from the Pacific is semi-skilled and 
unskilled labour’ (Luthria 2009). Again, 
it is not clear why an FTA is necessary to 
improve opportunities for Pacific islanders 
to work overseas. Australia and New 
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Zealand are developing temporary labour 
mobility schemes that allow small numbers 
of Pacific islanders to fill labour shortages 
in their horticultural industries. Demand 
for unskilled labour, however, fluctuates in 
both countries and a binding commitment 
to a quota of Pacific island workers as part 
of an FTA under PACER Plus is extremely 
unlikely.
The existing schemes are ‘market 
driven’ (with no set quotas, as employers 
determine the size of the annual intake 
of workers). Other FTAs negotiated by 
Australia and New Zealand do not offer 
hopeful precedents for the Pacific, as 
negotiations have focused on market access 
for executives, professionals and skilled 
self-employed contractors who service 
transnational corporations and meet skills 
shortages. As a recent study commissioned 
by the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat 
points out, Pacific ‘priorities include the 
free movement of skilled and unskilled 
labour, however we believe it is unlikely that 
PACER Plus negotiations will encompass 
free movement of unskilled labour’ (Nathan 
Associates 2007).
If Pacific island countries negotiate an 
FTA including trade in services in the hope 
of gaining labour mobility commitments, 
they could simply end up with what they 
already have. That is, they might gain a 
temporary labour mobility scheme designed 
to meet labour shortages in Australia and 
New Zealand (which can be suspended 
when unemployment rises in those coun-
tries) through Mode 4 concessions (with 
onerous conditions), or a side letter that 
deals with labour mobility. In return, Pacific 
island countries might have to liberalise 
a range of service markets and surrender 
sovereignty over key areas of national 
economic policymaking.
Regional labour mobility schemes, 
improvements in agricultural exports 
through the removal of quarantine barriers, 
investment in infrastructure and plans 
to expand training colleges and improve 
regional recognition of qualifications are 
all key priorities for the Pacific, but clearly 
an FTA is not the appropriate vehicle with 
which to pursue these interests.
Conclusion
The push to design PACER Plus as an 
FTA originates largely from policymakers 
in Australia and New Zealand (and from 
supporters at multilateral institutions such 
as the World Bank and the ADB). Australia 
and New Zealand have considerable 
experience negotiating FTAs and stand to 
gain commercially from PACER Plus. The 
majority of any increase in trade brought 
about by PACER Plus will come in the 
form of an increase in Australian and 
New Zealand exports to the Pacific island 
countries—displacing domestic production 
and imports from other countries and adding 
further to the considerable trade imbalances 
faced by many Pacific countries.
Kaufmann (2009) and other proponents 
of a regional FTA under PACER Plus argue 
that even if there were to be considerable 
tariff revenue losses under such a deal, 
Pacific island countries should simply bear 
these costs—at least in the short term—until 
the ‘benefits’ of an FTA are realised. It is not 
at all clear, however, that Pacific countries 
stand to gain much from an FTA with 
Australia and New Zealand—even in the 
longer term.
Island countries already have duty-free 
and quota-free access to Australian and 
New Zealand markets, and a traditional FTA 
will not necessarily solve other non-tariff 
barriers to trade (affecting potential exports 
of agricultural goods, for example). As 
Luthria (2009) from the World Bank writes, 
the ‘pain’ arising from an FTA could well 
be permanent
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This is where the stark reality of many 
small states facing preference erosion 
will need to be faced in bilateral, 
regional and ultimately multilateral 
trade liberalisation fora. For many 
small states this pain is permanent, 
because they simply do not have 
the size and location advantages to 
operationalise their comparative 
advantage. 
Rather than creating additional develop-
ment components to entice Pacific countries 
to enter a trade agreement that locks them 
into this ‘stark reality’, or finding ways 
to justify a trade deal designed to meet 
Australian and New Zealand commercial 
interests, perhaps a trade agreement should 
be designed to meet, first and foremost, the 
needs of the Pacific island countries.
Notes
1 While ‘SPARTECA Plus’ is put forward 
here as an alternative to PACER Plus, it is 
not necessary that a separate and different 
‘SPARTECA Plus’ agreement be negotiated to 
achieve a flexible, development-oriented trade 
agreement. The Australian government’s 
recent contention that PACER Plus is not 
linked to the original PACER means that 
there is no requirement whatsoever to design 
PACER Plus as a free trade agreement; 
the components of a ‘SPARTECA Plus’ 
alternative could form the content of PACER 
Plus itself.
2 In interviews with the authors, Fijian 
exporters complained that non-tariff barriers 
made it especially difficult to export to 
Australia. Sant Kumar, chairman of the 
Fiji Fruit and Vegetable Industry Council, 
explained that it had taken the better part 
of a decade to have heat-treated pawpaw 
cleared for entry into Australian markets 
(nine years longer than it took to gain entry 
to New Zealand). As Kumar explained: 
‘trade, trade, trade…all the time we hear 
that trade is a solution…I tell you how can 
there be any trade if there is no market access 
for our products?’ Saten Kumar, operations 
manager for Mahen’s Exports (based in the 
Sigatoka Valley in central Viti Levu, Fiji), 
said his company was focusing on exports 
to New Zealand, as a greater range of fresh 
produce was covered by bilateral quarantine 
agreements with New Zealand. Mahen’s 
Exports purchases about F$20,000 worth of 
produce from village farmers in the Sigatoka 
Valley each week, exporting dalo, eggplant, 
chillies, long beans, okra, curry leaves, dalo 
leaves (rourou), and so on. Fiji’s agricultural 
exports to New Zealand are much greater 
than to Australia. In 2008, Fiji exported nearly 
90,000 tonnes of agricultural produce to New 
Zealand, valued at F$48 million. Fiji exported 
just 15,000 tonnes to Australia, valued at F$36 
million (only F$15 million if sweet biscuits 
were excluded).
3 At present, Pacific island countries are still 
developing a regional certification for organic 
and fair trade produce. A new regional trade 
agreement could provide resources (and 
a timeline) for the establishment of such 
certification. Village farmers often lack the 
initial capital to gain fair trade or organic 
certification (costs are often high, requiring 
assessors to attend the farm site). ‘SPARTECA 
Plus’ could remove this market access barrier 
by providing resources for certification and 
for the reproduction of ‘best practice’ models 
for farmers’ cooperatives (cooperatives being 
more likely to meet certification costs).
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